Delhi”Mumbai Industrial Corridor: Development dilemmas

Forget about chasing unicorns (of the other kind). The  real action in India is in the manufacturing and   construction sector. The former is slated to receive a huge fillip in terms of investment with the government throwing its significant weight behind it so that it can contribute a quarter of the country’s GDP by 2022; the latter is expected is grow at eight per cent every year for the next decade. With a plethora of mega projects in  proposal or development phase and 100 Smart Cities planned in the five industrial corridors, manufacturing giants and their contractors can expect to be very busy in the coming years. Even though this sector accounted for only about a million new jobs between 2004″05 and 2011″12, the fact that over 100 million people will be joining the workforce over the next decade gives one a sense of the huge gap that needs to be urgently bridged and why there is additional emphasis on manufacturing in India.

Now, if the pundits at the current government’s  flagship programme Make in India are  to be believed, five mega industrial corridors covering half of India will be  the panacea for some of our nation’s ailments. Apart from Delhi”Mumbai  Industrial Corridor (DMIC), there’s Bengaluru”Mumbai Economic (as opposed to industrial) Corridor (BMEC), Chennai”Bengaluru  Industrial Corridor (CBIC), and Amritsar”Kolkata Industrial Corridor (AKIC).  Citizens of states not bestowed upon with these corridors will surely feel left  out but their combined populations aren’t worth giving attention to, as electoral math might indicate.

State governments aren’t to be left behind, of course.  Our most visible champion of hi-tech (since we are yet to produce a Steve Jobs  or, more importantly, the sartorial equivalent of a black turtleneck),  Chandrababu Naidu has his own plans for a Visakhapatnam”Chennai Industrial  Corridor (VCIC), which has the approval of Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the  central government. Of the total $1,000 million required investment, a cool $900 million is to be availed from ADB and the remaining has to be somehow  managed by the Andhra Pradesh government, leaving one questioning as to who  really is answerable for this project.

About DMIC

Simply put, if manufacturing is India’s (supposed)  next big hope, then the Delhi”Mumbai Industrial Corridor is its rousing,  inspirational, crowd-pleasing theme song. With the stated goal of making it a  ‘global manufacturing and trading hub’, the project is meant to showcase  India’s ability in planned urbanisation and world-class manufacturing and  services. DMIC is easily the largest infrastructure project to be undertaken in  India – at a cost of $100 billion and spanning the states of Delhi, Uttar  Pradesh, Haryana, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, and Maharashtra, it aims  to create infrastructure of the kind rarely seen in India, set up world-class  factories and logistics centres, and establish 24 smart cities (seven in the  first phase alone) with cutting-edge technology, connectivity across rail,  road, port and air, and uninterrupted power. Also on the agenda are skill  development of the local populace and generation of three million job  opportunities (two million in the manufacturing/processing sectors). The dedicated  freight corridor (DFC) covering a length of nearly 1,500 km will support high-speed  train connectivity and will run almost parallel to the Delhi”Mumbai Golden  Quadrilateral national highway. Initially, seven nodes (investment regions, IR,  and industrial areas, IA) in the DMIC states have been taken up for development.  In total, 24 such nodes are envisaged which are meant to facilitate business  generation with high-quality infrastructure. The corridor starts at Tughlakabad  and (now infamous) Dadri in Delhi NCR and ends at Jawaharlal Nehru Port at  Mumbai.

The project defines an investment region as a  specifically delineated industrial region with a minimum area of around 200  square kilometres; an industrial area is for the establishment of manufacturing  facilities for domestic and export-led production with a minimum area of around  100 square kilometres. Some of the projects include the Dholera investment  region in Gujarat, a model solar power project in Neemrana, Rajasthan, and
integrated industrial townships in Greater Noida and Vikram Udyogpuri (Madhya  Pradesh).

Planned urbanisation is a major focus area of the  project – for reference, India’s urban population is expected to rise to 36 per  cent in 2026, roughly translating into 590 million (greater than the current  combined population of the United States and Indonesia). Note that the dedicated  freight corridor is being constructed and will be operated by Dedicated Freight  Corridor Corporation of India (DFCCIL), an SPV that is controlled by the railways
ministry.

Officially launched in 2006 by the erstwhile UPA  government, the stake in DMIC Development Corporation (DMICDC) – the  implementation agency – is divided amongst the Indian government (49 per cent),  Japan Bank for International Cooperation (26 per cent), and government  financial institutions (the remainder). The government of Japan, aside from  providing state-of-the-art technology and expertise to the project, has also pledged financial support to the extent of $4.5 billion in the first phase at a  nominal rate of 0.1 per cent – this, together with the $4.5 billion to be  provided by the Indian government, will cover for basic infrastructure such as  roads, water pipelines, sewage lines, and waste collection. The 90 per cent of  the remaining funds is slated to come from private players, ostensibly due to  the increased value of the land post the initial development of the infrastructure  ” a significantly mammoth task and not without a few sceptics. Understandably,  the affected states are already jousting for potential investors. For instance,  the Greater Noida website encourages investors to put their money in the UP  region of DMIC touting its ‘locational advantages’, ‘top-class facilities’, and ‘attractive policies and projects’, among other such priceless qualities.

Structure and objectives

A brief summary of the governing structure for DMIC is  as follows. The apex authority includes the union finance minister, cabinet  ministers, and the state CMs. They have general oversight and overall policy responsibilities. DMICDC is the corporate entity responsible for project  management, monitoring, and coordination. It, in turn, works with the state-level  coordination entities and the special purpose companies (SPCs) that are project-specific  entities. The state-level nodal agencies are responsible for liaising between  the DMICDC and the various state government bodies as well as setting up of  various IRs/IAs. The modus operandi for implementation of the projects is public”private  partnerships, for which special purpose companies are established for  management, operation, and maintenance. These state-level coordination nodal  agencies work in tandem with the SPCs.

Five special purpose vehicles have been formed to date,  the release of funds by DMICDC being contingent upon the value of land  transferred by that state government. These SPVs (or SPCs) will govern the  smart cities”not unlike the SEZ model. Preliminary engineering work has already  been completed at Dholera in Gujarat, while land has been transferred and environmental clearances have been obtained for the Shendra Bidkin Industrial
Park in Maharashtra.

The lofty vision statement on DMICDC’s website reads ‘To  create strong economic base with globally competitive environment and  state-of-the-art infrastructure to activate local commerce, enhance foreign  investments and attain sustainable development.’

Striking the same optimistic note, some of the  admittedly ambitious goals include doubling of employment potential in five years (14.87  per cent CAGR), tripling industrial output in five years (24.57 per cent CAGR),  and quadrupling exports from the region in five years (31.95 per cent CAGR) – a  textbook example of geometric progression. The project influence area – defined  as the region extending up to 150 km to 200 km on both sides of the alignment  of the DFC – is 436,486 sq km, which accounts for 13.8 per cent of the geographical  area and 17 per cent of the total population of the country. The corridor hopes  to urbanise 12 per cent of the country in the next 30 years, leading to the  creation of 25 million jobs in the next 7 years; there are estimates that about  10 million job opportunities can be generated during the functional/operation  and maintenance stage as well. Travel time to transport goods from Delhi to the  western coast will be cut down from 14 days to 16 hours. On the sustainability  front, the DFC will save 457.5 million ton CO2 in 30 years, according to  estimates by the current railway minister. Reports by IL&FS and EY depict  that the DFC will result in a larger reduction of CO2 emissions as opposed to a  scenario without DFC, claiming that the same can range from 81 per cent to 97  per cent over a 30-year period. The latter estimate is under a low-carbon  scenario that assumes policy instruments such as a carbon tax and supply-side interventions to improve energy efficiency and energy intensity.

The exact mechanism of these projections is debatable,  information about this mammoth project is scarce, and the desirability and  feasibility of this project hasn’t been put to even a farcical public debate. As  succinctly articulated by this observer, ‘(DMIC) is also a great example of a project where  a study of facts, numbers, statistics and projections are increasingly futile  as they are constantly shifting.’ Still, the most amusing aspect of the project  is that DMICDC operates out of a hotel room in Hotel Ashok in New Delhi, which  seems incongruous with everything that this project stands for – size and  bombast. But one can still enjoy this uplifting video created by them.

Smart cities, smart choices?

Like the other crown jewel of this government’s  towering ambitions, the $168 billion river-linking project, DMIC has come in for  plenty of criticisms, brickbats, and widespread protests from every possible  stakeholder, starting with the question as to whether manufacturing is even  capable of creating the requisite number of jobs. The standard experience in  India is that this sector is hardly able to generate employment on a continual  basis. While there are enough incentives to set up a factory, sustaining it is  another matter”as the sheer number of vacant industrial areas will tell you.  Too often, farmers and small landowners who are promised jobs in these  factories in return for their land find themselves unemployed, eventually  forcing them to migrate to the cities. This, ironically, is what DMIC aims to  prevent by focusing on planned urbanisation and easing the pressure on the  already claustrophobic Indian metros. Although DMIC by virtue of its emphasis  on infrastructure and viable markets for the manufactured goods does aim to  avoid the fate of the many failed industrial regions, it remains to be seen how this on-paper holistic approach translates into actual practice. Then there is the issue that an export-oriented strategy will lead to the mushrooming of  large industries at the expense of small-scale ones, even though the latter  tend to generate more employment and are more favourable to smaller players who  often have limited access to capital and resources. Growing your way out of  poverty through export-led manufacturing is also unlikely to pay rich dividends  for India as it did for its frenemy China, a fact recognised by the RBI  governor Raghuram Rajan as well. Notwithstanding the wide chasms between the  two countries, the market out there is limited and isn’t going to ‘accommodate  another China’.

Smart cities – which provide the glam factor to an  otherwise vanilla project like DMIC – themselves have come under flak. Like  some of China’s infamous ‘ghost cities’, here in India, the Rs 78,000 crore  Gujarat International Finance Tec-City, or GIFT (a 40-minute drive from Ahmedabad), is used as an example of how smart cities may not always be a smart  strategy. The city, expected to create one million direct and indirect jobs,  hasn’t been able to attract even 50 per cent total occupancy of its two 29-storey  buildings. Aside from the glaring flaws of investing in smart cities when both  education and health budgets have been slashed, one strident criticism for  smart cities is that it promotes and propagates inequalities and social  divisions. The major beneficiaries of smart cities will be sections of the  society that are already privileged. The urban poor, migrant labourers, and  workers in the informal sectors are unlikely to be blessed by the shining light  of these gated communities. As to how ‘green’ these cities will really be is  anybody’s guess. The non-profit Centre for Science and Environment (CSE) is of the opinion that these new towns do not have clear benchmarks, implementation  strategies, or strong regulatory safeguards. Smart city doesn’t necessarily  mean smart investment in the nation’s future.

One important aspect to take cognisance of is that  smart cities – like their forerunners, the SEZs – are governed by Article 243Q  of the Indian Constitution. This essentially means that they can be governed by  bodies comprising of private companies and individuals, unlike an elected  panchayat or municipalities. It is a loophole clause introduced at the last  minute when the bill was being taken up for consideration. A widespread and  valid fear is that by elevating non-elected personnel and entities to governing  positions, dilution of existing regulations as well as democracy will occur.  Also, accountability and dispute resolution will become that much more  difficult. Proponents of democracy feel that this is a dangerous trend and can  herald innumerable issues and abuses of power. For instance, the Sarvahara Jan  Andolan (Movements of Destitutes), which successfully opposed the Raigad SEZ,  highlighted the fact that in the DMIC area in which it operates, all powers that  were hitherto with their gram panchayats had been suddenly taken away. Now, for  all land dealings the Navi Mumbai Industrial Area authorities have to be  consulted – this has been done without any discussion in the parliament or the  legislative assembly.

Dholera, slated to be one of the biggest smart cities  in India with a size twice that of Mumbai and bigger than Shanghai, is home to  small farmers (nearly 50 per cent of the affected land is agricultural) and at  a perpetual risk of flooding. Activists have protested against its  implementation for months citing the impact on subsistence and landless  farmers, the faulty impact assessment, and the broader environmental impact of  the proposed urbanisation. It must be kept in mind that it  will be governed by Gujarat Infrastructure Development Board, Regional  Development Authority and project-specific SPVs, and not any democratically elected personnel, like in all the other smart cities. Protests have been  going on, with farmers and pastorals opposing land acquisitions. A procession  for this began on 1 November last year, ending at the Ahmedabad collector’s  office six days later. Interestingly, as part of the compensation, the state  government will give these farmers land equivalent to 50 per cent of their  acquired land which may or may not be fit for cultivation – a prospect that  most of them understandably find unacceptable. The environment impact  assessment (EIA) has been carried out by a firm that is only provisionally  accredited (that is, they do not cover all 12 functional areas by approved  experts, as mandated by the National Accreditation Board for Education and  Training). EIA is extremely important to ensure sustainable development,  especially for large-scale projects such as DMIC, and it forms the scientific  edifice on which decisions related to these projects are taken.

Land-acquisition hazards

Each state government has its own strategy,  compensation mechanisms (the number of ‘right’ connections is quantum  mechanically entangled with the land valuation), and incentives for acquiring  land, but what remains common across all states is the opposition to it. Multiple court cases are going on in various high courts, filed by landowners, farmers,  and people whose livelihoods are dependent on the land at risk of being taken  over for the project. The fear”not unwarranted”is that like most big projects  in India, this too shall fail spectacularly while depriving the affected  community of their only hedge against the vagaries of poverty and unemployment.

An investigation by The Guardian found that in Pithampur (part of the Pithampur”Dhar”Mhow  IR, planned as a centre of manufacturing industries), which is already divided  into four SEZs, factories meant for small-scale manufacturing are lying  unoccupied and rotting away, amounting to about 40 per cent of the total area. It  is not clear if there will be any effort to revive these factories as a part of  the overall project. Water shortage is already a common problem faced by  existing factories in the area. In the meantime, affected farmers from the  Kallibillod village have petitioned the Bhopal High Court to rule against the  acquisition. Protests have also erupted in Raigad, Mandal Becharaji (near  Ahmedabad), Bawal in Haryana, Bodaki (near Greater Noida), and Bidkin in  Maharashtra. In Dharuhera, Haryana (part of the Manesar”Bawal IR), villagers  have protested against land acquisition in part due to the already heavy  pollution along the existing industrial estate. At times, matters have taken a  violent turn as in 2012 when riots broke out and four buses were burnt along  the road.

In Maharashtra, the state government had to reduce the  size of the land to be acquired for the proposed industrial area at Dighi Port in  Raigad district after prolonged agitation by affected farmers and locals. Originally  slated to be 25,000 hectares, it was brought down to about 6,500 hectares,  raising the question if the sheer amount of land being purportedly required for  DMIC is even backed by reasonable assessment. It has been estimated that 20 per  cent to 25 per cent of the land acquired by the Industrial Development  Corporations in five states (Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh,  Rajasthan, and Gujarat) is not being used for any productive purpose. In Raigad  itself, out of a total of 7,000 acres of land, 2,000 acres are vacant and another 1,700 acres are occupied by defunct units.

In some cases, like the Shendra”Bidkin Industrial Park  in Maharashtra, land acquisition has gone relatively smoothly. This is thanks  in no small part to the arid land and the generous valuation that included the  additional kicker of landowners being able to buy back 15 per cent of the land  at acquisition rates after the infrastructure has been built. Even here,  concerns have been raised on water shortages. The Jayakwadi dam built on  Godavari River is barely able to sustain the needs of the millions of people in  the surrounding regions, and it is anybody’s guess as to how it will be able to  accommodate the needs of this mega project.

Land acquisition is of course a thorny issue in this  country. When power structures are as skewed as they are here, one could be  forgiven for being a tad sceptical about it. Since Independence, between 60 and  65 million people are estimated to have been displaced in India due to  development projects. And unlike internally displaced people, the government is  not obliged to resettle or rehabilitate them as they are not considered to be ‘internally  displaced’ – that label is reserved for those impacted by conflicts or natural  disasters. The historical record of taking over land for industrial purpose  provides no solace and neither does the chequered success of making some productive  use of that land. A piece of land is not just an income-generating entity for  the farmer (or anyone who depends on that land, for that matter); it is possibly the only tangible guarantee that they have against the injustice of  the past, the brutalities of the present, and the uncertainties of the future. Even  in cases where a fair compensation is given to the landowner, often the money  is inadequate to support an entire family or may be squandered away, resulting  in bankruptcy. The lack of employment opportunities drives them to the cities,  where they become another struggling cog in the giant wheel of a suffocating  machinery. The past experiences of many people lay claim to the fact that often  these industrial and investment projects fail to generate even a modicum of the  promised jobs or prosperity, and instead increase impoverishment and poverty. Studies  have shown that 90 per cent of displacements in India is due to land  acquisition for state projects, and often the low compensation leads to a  perfect recipe for further destitution of the landowners. As an example, in  Maharashtra, the Maharashtra Development Industrial Corporation (MIDC) is responsible for acquiring land for DMIC. However, out of 229 MIDC industrial  areas, 80 per cent of the plants are currently shut and people who had to give  up their land for these projects are still awaiting the promised improvement in  their conditions.

The laws governing land acquisition have been  criticised by civil society and corporates alike for widely differing reasons,  even after the previous Congress-led government tried to plug some holes in  them. It was believed that one of the reasons the current central government  wanted to replace the 2013 land-acquisition law was to make land acquisition easier  for the DMIC. At the end of 2014, the government promulgated an ordinance  (which ultimately died a thankfully timely death) to exempt infrastructure  initiatives, including industrial corridors and PPP projects, from the social  impact assessment exercise that other projects must go through. These projects  were also absolved from having to gain the consent of 80 per cent of landowners (70 per cent for PPP projects) who would be impacted. Much hue and cry ensued  before the government had to admit defeat.

Corridor to nowhere

For a project that has deep and irreversible impact on  multiple stakeholders including the very citizens that it claims to be designed  for, there has been very little consultation with civil society groups and  elected bodies on its overall structure and policy. DMIC is a passion project  of the government and by the government, with a generous sprinkling of expertise  provided by technocrats and corporate elites. Much like other supposedly trailblazing  initiatives, it is shrouded in secrecy because, after all, democracy is useful  only during election time. A report by the Japan Center for a Sustainable  Environment and Society even stated that ‘in none of the areas in the influence  zone, democratically elected local government institutions or elected representatives have been consulted at any step of the project design,  implementation or finalisation.’ Let alone any semblance of a public debate, the public will do well if its interests are even taken into final  consideration by the powers that be. It doesn’t inspire much confidence when  one realises that the project has been endorsed by a secretive cult called McKinsey,  widely known for being the resident advisors of every corporate behemoth and  government seeking to embrace free markets and widening inequality. Its 2010 ‘India’s Urban Awakening’ report (which came out not long after Scott Wilson Group’s ‘Detailed Perspective Plan’ on DMIC) recommended the construction of 19 such industrial  corridors in order to fast-track the country’s urbanisation. Possibly McKinsey  wishes to contribute in nation building by providing its deep sectoral  knowledge to each of these corridors. That report has become the bible of  anyone espousing to understand India and know what it really wants – an overdose of planned, distributed urbanisation.

A critical area that has come under heavy scrutiny and  been found wanting is the issue of water resources for DMIC. A study by Romi  Khosla and Vikram Soni found that the project would have to “extract two-thirds of the total water needed from rivers and the rest from severely stressed  groundwater aquifers, which are already polluted and overexploited.’ The amount that can be currently used from the existing rivers in the region without  damaging them ecologically is already being drawn by existing users. Building  dams is also not a solution as all these rivers already have multiple dams  diverting their flow. The authors raise a pertinent point as to how then such a  large-scale project is even considered feasible. Similar concerns have been raised with regard to the Narmada Kshipra Pipeline Project, which is to supply 25 per cent of the 362 MLD water to Pitampur industrial area in Malwa, leaving  ordinary consumers and groundwater high and dry.

Land use is another key environmental aspect that  needs to be analysed. It is common knowledge that human activities drastically  alter the land cover and the environment around it, mostly for the worse.  Activities such as creating industrial zones and residential areas, and mining  result in loss of forests, wetlands, productive lands and biodiversity,  contribute to carbon emissions and hence global warming, has negative effect on  the biosphere, and results in soil erosion and water pollution, amongst others.  Most of the DMIC area falls under arid or semi-arid land that has low adaptive capacity and is vulnerable to even minor changes in the climate. Communities  living in these areas are not only dependent on the land for their sustenance  but are also deeply impacted by warming temperatures and erratic weather patterns, which are a direct output of land cover being modified for human needs. The DFC will also cut across or come precariously close to wildlife  sanctuaries, home to many of our planet’s precious animals, like Balaram  Sanctuary situated along the Aravali Hill series in northern Gujarat and  Velavadar Black Buck Park near Dholera. Green activists are up in arms, noting that mega projects rarely bring in the promised development while causing irreparable harm to the environment. So-called environment clearances are  usually met with scathing criticism and dismissed as mere tokenism.

Other issues with high potential for negative and long-term  consequences (explored by Japan Center for a Sustainable Environment and  Society as well) is the lack of food security due to the impact on subsistence  farming and fertile soil, loss of employment, and disaster-risk reduction. On  the issue of drainage systems and waste management, although the intentions  seem to be noble, it is to be seen how much of that is actually translated into  real action. Indian cities are suffering from an acute crisis of rampant and  indiscriminate urbanisation, with scant regard for important aspects like  natural drainage systems or protecting water bodies. The recent Chennai floods are  an excellent case in point, as this news report clearly demonstrates. Studies have shown that the  increasing trend towards heavy rainfall is more likely to be over heavily  urbanised areas. One can only hope that the new smart cities take into cognisance of these non-negotiable aspects.

Another relevant observation is with regard to the  labour policies employed by most factories in India. The rampant use of  contract workers who usually have lower wages, little or no health insurance,  and no job guarantee is a blatant exploitation of them. As has been the  trajectory in most developed nations, collective bargaining rights (which work  as a bulwark against working-class oppression) have also been trampled upon.  Unsurprisingly, workers have erupted in protests in all the major industrial  hubs of Gurgaon, Manesar, Dharuhera, and Bawal that frame the starting points  of DMIC, including at Maruti and Daikin. With the government’s attempt at further labour market ‘liberalisation’, workers at the envisaged factories in  DMIC may just have to be prepared for further dilution of their rights. Factory  owners may also hire more migrant labourers as they fear that locals are more  likely to organise and demand higher wages and better working conditions. Then  again, DMIC does promise a veritable windfall of jobs. But if this is at the  expense of people losing their current livelihoods only to struggle in producing surplus labour for their management overlords, does it mean one step  forward and two backwards?

One of the noteworthy but oft ignored features of DMIC  is the involvement of the Japanese state machinery. While one can take a  reasonable guess as to the reasons for their deep interest in this project, the  initial task-force meetings do shed some predictable and interesting light on matters. The first task-force meeting in 2007 resulted in the Japan contingent demanding a reliable decision-making system to realise DMIC within a short  period including land acquisition (the ill-fated 2014 ordinance?),  simplification of the Domestic Tax System (which has taken the form of GST),  smooth interstate movement for freight vehicles, substantial reduction in  tariffs/provision of various tax incentives to investors (a perennial  favourite), liberalising of labour laws, deregulation of remittance of royalty  and salary income, and removing of restrictions relating to licensing  agreements – all of which are core tenets of neoliberal policies. The  subsequent task-force meetings served to further reinforce these demands.

CB view

‘Make in India’ has a nice ring to it, but exactly who  will end up actually making it in a GDP-obsessed nation is an open question. If  the effect of neoliberal policies in other countries is anything to go by, it  is unlikely to be the poor and working class. Then there is the spectre of climate change – growing, powerful, and unavoidable. The enormous footprint left by these mega projects causes more harm than good, if not in terms of  emissions (extremely likely), then by appropriating land and water resources and  destabilising an already off-kilter ecological state. The effect on communities  has already been articulated and their fear and distrust is justified and  should be identifiable by anyone who has been at the receiving end of this  country’s unfair, unworkable system. There’s no estimate yet of the number of  people who will be displaced due to this project, but a conservative guess would  run into hundreds of thousands. And if history has taught us anything, it is to  be extremely sceptical of anything that has incalculable scope and nebulous  aims, especially when there is little transparency on the actual details and  due-diligence process.

While infrastructure in terms of connectivity, power and technology is obviously important, how does one reconcile these with the other kind of infrastructure”land and water”that cannot be built from scratch  or ordinanced into existence? It is not much of a surprise that mega  development projects always seem to appropriate resources that are the life  force of the marginalised sections rather than of those who are relatively  better off. Processes of resource extraction, land seizures and industrial production always and inevitably  affect the poor disproportionately. Sure, manufacturing can contribute to a  healthy GDP, especially if tax bonanzas, abolishment of labour and environment  laws (which the government is already actively trying to enforce), and rampant  foreign money are the mantra. That doesn’t necessarily mean a healthier and  happier nation. DMIC as a concept sounds attractive but, like they say, it may  turn out to be good on paper, bad in practice. For the sake of India, one can  only hope that DMIC becomes an exception to this time-tested rule.